Articles
| Open Access | PRIORITY QUEUING REALLOCATION MECHANISMS: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARATIVE STUDY
Abstract
This experimental study investigates the efficiency and effectiveness of reallocation mechanisms in the context of priority queuing systems. Priority queues play a critical role in various applications, from healthcare to computer networking, where timely resource allocation is essential. We conduct controlled experiments to compare and analyze different reallocation strategies, shedding light on their impact on system performance, fairness, and responsiveness. The findings from this study provide valuable insights for optimizing priority queuing systems in diverse domains.
Keywords
Priority queuing, Reallocation mechanisms, Experimental study
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